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Abstract
I decompose the variance of earnings of Finnish male and female workers to its per-
manent and transitory components and study their evolution between the years 1998 and
2007. I find that the increasing earnings inequality of men and women is driven by both
transitory and permanent components of earnings. In addition, I find considerable differ-
ences in earnings dynamics between men and women that have been largely neglected in
previous studies of earnings dynamics. The inequality among men is dominated by the
permanent component. Conversely, permanent and transitory components are of compa-
rable magnitudes to women. As a corollary, men face more stable income paths but with
larger permanent earnings differences. Women, on the other hand, face more instable
earnings profiles but have smaller permanent differences in earnings.
The correlation between initial earnings inequality and the growth in earnings inequal-
ity is found to be positive for both sexes, implying a divergence of earnings profiles towards
end of the working career. In addition, earnings instability has risen for both sexes.
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1 Introduction
Growing earnings inequality has been a common phenomenon in most of the developed coun-
tries since the 1970s. The need to understand this phenomenon has spurred a great deal of
research.
Traditional studies of earnings inequality in Finland as well as studies for other coun-
tries have concentrated on measuring cross-sectional earnings inequality and its year-to-year
changes. Concentrating on cross-sectional inequality hides an important element of economic
inequality, namely the mobility of individuals within the earnings distribution.
More recent studies on earnings dynamics stress the importance of decomposing earnings
inequality into permanent and transitory components. These two components have a different
impact on long run income differences and consequently have different welfare implications. If
the rise in yearly income inequality is driven by the transitory component, it may suggest that
earnings have become more risky. This, in turn, may decrease welfare if individuals are not
able to completely smooth out income fluctuations. This might happen if earnings shocks are
either very large or very persistent. On the other hand, if the rise in yearly income inequality
is due to the changes in returns to education or other fixed worker attributes, it implies an
increased inequality in career earnings as well. If the yearly income inequality is driven by
the transitory component, we should observe more year-to-year mobility within the income
distribution. This leads to an increase of inequality in the short term but not in the long run.
If the permanent component dominates the transitory component, it implies that low earnings
are a permanent rather than an isolated experience.
Examples of factors contributing to permanent component of earnings include changes in
returns to education, skill, on-the-job training, or other factors that are relatively fixed from
the point of view of an individual worker.1
In this paper, I decompose year-to-year variance of earnings into permanent and transi-
tory components and study their evolution over time by fitting an error component model to
observed second moments of individual earnings processes using Finnish data. My data are
based on filed tax reports, so measurement errors due to misreporting are arguably substan-
tially smaller than they would be if the data was survey-based.
The vast majority of existing studies decomposing earnings inequality into transitory and
permanent components only concentrates on males, making the implicit assumption that the
earnings inequality of male workers is a good measure for overall earnings inequality.2 The main
contribution of this paper to existing literature is that I present measures of permanent and
transitory components of earnings separately for men and women. This echoes the observations
of Napari (2008), who reports substantial differences in fields of education between men and
women and also substantial segregation of occupations and firms into those dominated by
1It should be stressed that income volatility may or may not be equivalent to economic risk. As discussed
in Blundell et al. (2008), earnings volatility does not necessarily translate into changes in welfare. Whether
changes in income volatility have welfare implications depends on whether changes are anticipated and whether
individuals are able to insure themselves against the instability of earnings.
2A notable exception is Ziliak et al. (2011), who reports measures of permanent and transitory earnings
inequality separately for men and women as well as different educational groups, but does not limit their study
to people working.
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males and those by females, as noted by Korkeamäki & Kyyrä (2006). Consequently, the
picture of earnings inequality based only on males might be misleading. To get comparable
figures for men and women, I limit my sample to working males and females and compare
their earnings dynamics.
In addition, no existing paper decomposes Finnish earnings inequality into permanent and
transitory components. Therefore, I am able to compare earnings dynamics experienced by
Finnish workers to earnings dynamics experienced by workers in countries with very different
labor market institutions, e.g., Canada, U.K., and the U.S. Finally, my earnings data spans
years between 1988 and 2007, allowing me to study relatively recent developments of earnings
dynamics.
The current paper is heavily influenced by a series of papers studying the earnings dynamics
in other countries. Pioneering studies in this field include Gottschalk & Moffitt (1994), Moffitt
& Gottschalk (2002), Baker (1997), and Haider (2001), all of which have been highly influential
in studying earnings dynamics in the U.S. by applying GMM estimation techniques. Following
in their footsteps, Baker & Solon (2003) and Dickens (2000) present a similar decomposition
for Canada and the U.K., respectively. Due to the larger data they have at their disposal, they
are able to fit considerably more general models than the ones based on U.S. data. More recent
papers using European registry based data fit variants of Baker & Solon (2003) and Dickens
(2000). These include Gustavsson (2008), who studies a long Swedish panel from 1960 to 1990
and Ramos (2003) who studies British earnings data from the 1990s and Cappellari (2004),
who studies Italian earnings data between 1970 and 1990. Even though the exact model
specifications as well as time periods under consideration vary from country to country, the
general finding in the aforementioned papers is that there are significant differences between
countries in terms of earnings dynamics. This motivates replicating the analysis using data
from other countries.
It turns out that increasing earnings inequality is driven by both, permanent and transitory
components, but their contribution is different for men and for women. For men, permanent
inequality dominates the transitory inequality. For women, they are of similar magnitude. In
addition, permanent earnings differences vary substantially between cohorts. Male cohorts are
more equal in terms of their permanent earnings compared to women. There has also been a
trend increase in earnings instability of both sexes during the observation period.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the sample selection
criteria. Section 3 introduces the model of earnings dynamics and outlines the estimation
method. Section 4 provides results and visualizes them. Section 5 offers conclusions.
2 Data and sample selection
The data used consists of a panel of a one-third random sample of Finnish census. It covers
the years 1988-2007.
The measure of earnings used in this paper is yearly work earnings before taxes. Earnings
are calculated from individual tax files. To ensure comparability between years, all earnings
are deflated to EUR 2007 using the Consumer Price Index. By definition, yearly earnings
are given by hourly wage multiplied by the hours worked. Therefore, earnings inequality
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reflects two dimensions of inequality, inequality in productivity and inequality in hours worked.
Consequently, the variance of yearly earnings is higher than the variance of hourly wages unless
the covariance of wages and hours worked is negative and large (Abowd & Card, 1989).
My measure of earnings inequality is the variance of log yearly earnings. This is the
standard in papers studying earnings dynamics. The motivation for the choice of inequality
measure is that the mathematical properties of variance are well established. In addition, the
correlation between the variance of log earnings and other widely used inequality measures is
very close to 1. The downside of this choice is that it is not measure-free. Thus, the choice of
currency units and base year affects the measure of total earnings inequality. Nonetheless, the
measure only affects the level of inequality, but not the changes. Moreover, the decomposition
is unaffected by the measure.
Registry data has some advantages over survey data. Since earnings information is collected
as a part of the administrative process, non-response and incorrect answers can be ruled out
resulting in extremely reliable data on earnings.3 Attrition from the data can happen only by
migration or death. A possible caveat of using a long time series derived from tax registries
is that variable definitions may vary over time. Even though the definition of total taxable
income has changed as tax laws have changed during the period of 1988-2007, the definition
of taxable earnings has remained stable.
Concentrating only on work earnings naturally hides some of the income differences preva-
lent in the society, because the total income of individuals is defined as a sum of earnings,
capital income, income transfers recieved and taxes paid. Supplementing earnings data by
including capital incomes is not feasible due to limited data. Moreover, including income
transfers and paid taxes would introduce problems because changes in tax laws and social
security eligibility rules would severely limit the length of the time series. Another reason to
prefer the measure of income chosen in this paper is that it is broadly equivalent to other
papers published, thus facilitating international comparisons.
A minor caveat in the data for the purposes of this paper is that earnings of over 200,000
Euros are top-coded due to statistical secrecy laws. This group is small (between .01 % and
.05% of yearly observations), so their effect to estimates is arguably small.
2.1 Sample selection criteria
The sample selection criteria are adopted from Haider (2001). The motivation for these criteria
is to ensure that earnings dynamics of people who are working are not confounded by people
who are switching between work and non-work.
The target group in my sample is prime age working males and females aged between 26
and 60 who are observed for at least six years. I assume that by age 26, people have mostly
finished their educations.
I include person-year observations only if the main type of activity of a person is “working”.
In other words, I exclude students, the unemployed, the retired, and other people outside of the
workforce. I limit my attention to people who are working because my interest is in earnings
3Gottschalk & Huynh (2010) show that earnings inequality decompositions based on PSID most likely
overstate both earnings mobility and earnings inequality because of non-classical measurement errors.
4
dynamics of people who are consistently above the extensive margin. I also exclude working
people with zero yearly earnings.
After applying the sample selection criteria, I am left with a ”revolving unbalanced panel”
(following the terminology in Haider, 2001). The panel is unbalanced because all cohorts are
not observed for all years. The length of the panel varies between 6 and 20 years, depending on
the cohort. Using an unbalanced panel breaks the collinearity between year, age, and cohort,
making it possible to identify all of them separately. Since people are included only if they
fulfill the criteria of selection, they may enter and exit the panel. This feature makes the panel
revolving.
Applying a revolving unbalanced panel overcomes problems related to compositional changes
in the workforce related to the business cycle. If workers with instable earnings only enter the
workforce during an economic boom, they are not included in the data, as long as other sample
selection criteria are not fulfilled. For example, assume that a person fulfills the age criteria
of selection and is working in years 1988 and 1990–1994, total of 6 years. In this case, the
earnings observations of the person only contribute to the estimation of earnings dynamics in
the years he is observed. Another person, who is working for only 5 years, does not contribute
to the estimation at all.
Since it might be likely that individuals with very volatile earnings are also more likely to
permanently exit the panel, the approach chosen here introduces potential bias to the esti-
mates. Correcting for attrition is not feasible because the data lacks instruments for selection.
Still, the approach chosen here is less restrictive than analyses based on fully balanced panels.
In addition, including only people with no breaks in their earnings histories would probably
overstate the contribution of permanent earnings component. Using a revolving panel also
allows much larger sample sizes compared to a balanced panel.
Previous papers studying the covariance structure of earnings concentrate only on males.
This is because changes in female workforce participation might confound estimates of earnings
instability of women. I use a revolving unbalanced panel, which overcomes this problem at
least partially. Furthermore, the labor force participation rate of Finnish women is very high
(Pissarides et al., 2003), which means that endogenous participation is less of a problem than
in some other countries.
Even though sample selection criteria somewhat differ from other studies due to different
structure of data used, they are consistent within the observation period, thus enabling com-
parisons between years. Comparisons between countries, on the other hand, might be subject
to criticism.
I categorize people in two year birth cohorts and follow each cohort through time. Studies
based on smaller data have been forced to pool all cohorts together due to small sample sizes.
This naturally hides some of the heterogeneity of earnings dynamics between cohorts.
The total size of the sample used in the analysis is given in Table 1. The sample sizes are
considerably larger than those used by other researchers. For example, the total sample size in
Haider (2001) is 32,105 individuals and sample size in Gustavsson (2008) is 76,709 individuals.
5
2.2 Covariance structure of earnings by cohort
In Figure 1, I plot the observed earnings variance for workers selected by the selection criteria
given above. For both sexes, the variance decreases between years 1988-1991, and thereafter
it goes up until it peaks around 1994. After 1994 earnings inequality goes down somewhat
but remains high until the end of the sample period. The variances plotted in Figure 1 are
somewhat higher than those observed in most other similar studies. This might be because
I cannot discriminate between full-time and part-time workers. Moreover, in studies based
on filed income tax reports, earnings are censored from below, because income below the tax
limit is not observed. This is not the case in this paper.
To grasp the essential features of earnings dynamics, it is useful to inspect the autocor-
relation profiles of earnings by year and cohort. I have calculated yearly variance as well as
autocovariances between years for people who are observed in both years. For cohorts which
are observed for the full twenty years this adds up to 21 × 20/2 = 210 unique covariance
elements and less for other cohorts. In total, unique elements of covariance matrices add up
to 3,066 covariance elements.
Figure 2 presents the yearly variances and covariances between yearly earnings for selected
cohorts of men and women. Figure 2 demonstrates that there are substantial differences in
variances as well as autocovariances of male and female earnings. This suggests that there
are considerable differences in earnings dynamics of men and women, making it reasonable
to estimate separate models for men and women. In addition, comparison of years reveals
strong year effects. These are especially apparent during the recession of the early 1990s. The
difference of variance and first autocovariance is relatively large. In addition, autocovariances
remain positive even at long lags, indicating that there are considerable permanent earnings
differences. Finally, the variance and the autocovariance values are larger for the oldest cohort
even at longer lags, which suggests the presence of cohort effects in permanent component of
earnings.
An alternative way to study cohort covariances is to keep the year fixed and plot covariances
by age. This is done for three selected years in Figure 3. Comparing years reveals that income
variances and covariances have risen with time for men as well as for women, which indicates
that earnings inequality has increased during the panel time and at least part of this rise is
due to rise in permanent earnings differences. The variances are higher for young women than
for young men, but as people grow older, the higher growth in variances of male earnings
causes men to overtake women in terms of earnings inequality. The difference between the
variance and autocovariances of earnings is at its largest for young women, indicating that
high earnings inequality of young women is driven by transitory differences. For men, the
difference between variance and covariances remains almost constant with respect to age.
To summarize, in addition to being able to disentangle permanent and transitory income
differences, the preferred model for earnings inequality should allow cohort as well as year
effects. The model should also allow for the variances of permanent and transitory components
to change as people age.
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3 Model and estimation
In this section, I introduce the econometric model and the estimation methodology. I estimate
an error-components model with permanent and transitory components. The model allows
individuals to permanently differ in their mean earnings as well as the earnings growth rate.
The transitory component is modeled as an AR(1) process. As a result, even transitory shocks
are allowed to exhibit persistence and take more than a year to dampen.
3.1 Econometric model
Let Yibt denote log earnings in year t of person i born in year b. Individual earnings can be
expressed as deviations from means, or
Yibt = µbt + yibt.
Since my interest lies in the second moments of the distribution of Yibt, it suffices to write a
model for de-meaned wages yibt. Expressing µbt as cohort-age means captures average year, age,
and cohort effects in a more flexible fashion than using regression models with cohort-specific
polynomials. The simplest possible model for yibt is
yibt = ptαibt + λtεibt (1)
where the two are orthogonal to each other. Equation (1) can be seen as a Mincerian earnings
equation of relative earnings, where αibt stands for the observed characteristics of individuals
and εibt is the error term. pt and λt are year-specific factor loadings. Applying variance
operator to both sides yields
var (yibt) = p
2
tσ
2
α + λ
2
tσ
2
ε . (2)
Equation (2) gives the basic intuition of variance decomposition. ptσ2α denotes the variance
of the permanent component of earnings, and λtσ2ε denotes the variance of the transitory
component. An increase in either component increases the dispersion of earnings, but an
increase in λtσ2ε also implies that churning within the earnings distribution increases.
Even though Equation (2) is intuitive, it may be too restrictive for two reasons. First,
the variance of transitory shocks may exhibit age-related heteroskedasticity because workers
in the start of their careers may have more instable earnings.4 In addition, different cohorts
may have different skills or other characteristics that affect the variability of their earnings.
To incorporate these features, the following generalization of Equation (1) is used
yibt = qcptuibt + εibt, (3)
where
uibt = αi + βix, (4)
εibt = ρεibt−1 + λtνibt, (5)
4Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) report significant heteroskedasticity in earnings instability using U.S. data,
albeit using a different model. Baker & Solon (2003) and Gustavsson (2008) reach similar conclusions using
Canadian and Swedish data, respectively.
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where αi, βi and νi are random variables with distributions:[
αi
βi
]
∼
([
α¯
β¯
]
,
[
σ2α σαβ
σ2β
])
(6)
and
νibt ∼
(
ν¯, γ0 + γ1x+ γ2x
2
)
. (7)
x is defined as the potential experience of each cohort in year t, i.e., x = t− b− 26.
In Equation (4) uibt is a random growth term. It describes the permanent component
of earnings. σ2α reflects variance of earnings profiles of individuals at the age of 26, and the
variance in σ2β reflects the deviation of individual-specific growth rate from the average growth
rate of each cohort (the average growth rate is captured in µbt). pt and qc are year and cohort
factor loadings, respectively.
The transitory component of earnings in (5) is given by a mean-reverting AR(1) process.
λt are year-specific factor loadings on the innovation νibt. This specification assumes that an
earnings shock takes more than one year to dampen out and that earnings shocks accumulate
over time. In addition, Equation (7) allows transitory variance to be a quadratic function of
age. Transitory and permanent components of earnings are assumed to be orthogonal to one
another. To make identification possible, I have normalized p1988 and λ1989 and q1951−1952 to
1.
Equations (3)–(7) generate non-stationarity to the variances of earnings processes through
time-varying factor loadings for the permanent and the transitory components, pt and λt.
Another source of non-stationarity is the polynomial form of the variance of transitory shocks.
The intuition remains the same: a rise in pt or qc increases permanent inequality of workers,
whereas a rise in λt increases the shuﬄing of workers.
In line with the model specifications in Baker & Solon (2003) and Gustavsson (2008), the
polynomial form of var(νibt) recognizes that earnings instability may vary between individuals
because they are at different stages of their careers. Yearly factor loadings for permanent and
transitory components also give insights in to forces driving changes in income distribution.
The motivation of formulation in Equation (4) is both theoretical and empirical. It has
been successfully applied in, e.g., Haider (2001), Ramos (2003), and Cappellari (2004) who
demonstrate that in addition to allowing heterogeneity in mean earnings, the slope of earnings
and the covariance of the two are important in capturing the dynamics of earnings. In most
previous studies, the covariance term σαβ is found to be negative. This is consistent with
the on-the-job training hypothesis (see, e.g., Lillard & Weiss, 1979; Hause, 1980; and Baker,
1997), which states that individuals may accept lower earnings in the beginning of their career,
since they anticipate that their earnings will rise at a high enough rate and for a long enough
time that they will be compensated for the low earnings at the beginning of their career.
On the other hand, if σαβ is found to be positive, it is consistent with a schooling-matching
hypothesis, in which more skilled workers are endowed with more education, which raises their
initial earnings and face faster earnings growth as the quality of the match is revealed to their
employers (Cappellari, 2004).
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In addition to the specification in Equations (3)–(7) usually known as “random growth
specification” I have also experimented with other specifications. Particularly, another widely
used specification for the permanent component is the so-called “random walk specification”
(e.g., Gustavsson, 2008). This model is given by uibt = uibt−1 + ξit, where ξit is a white
noise process. The main difference between the two formulations is that the random growth
specification allows the correlation of the intercept and slope terms to be nonzero, whereas the
random walk specification does not. In this sense, the random growth specification nests the
random walk specification. Trials with the random growth specification always resulted in a
statistically significant estimate for σαβ. I interpret this as a sign that a random walk model
is inconsistent with the observed covariance structure of earnings. Random walk and random
growth specifications have different implications in terms of age-derivative of cross-sectional
variances. Under the random walk specification, the variance of earnings increases linearly
with age, whereas under the random growth specification, the growth of permanent earnings
inequality is either convex or concave, depending on the sign of σαβ (Guvenen, 2009).5
3.2 Estimation
Direct estimation of a model based on equations (3)-(7) is inefficient because it means es-
timating αi and βi for each individual with only a small number of observations. Since I
am interested in the second moments of earnings distribution, I estimate them directly. To
accomplish this, I write down the variance of earnings on year t for cohort b implied by (3):
var (yibt) = q
2
cp
2
t
[
σ2α + x
2σ2β + 2xσαβ
]
+
ρ2var (εibt−1) + λ2t var (νibt) . (8)
Respectively, a general covariance element between year t earnings and year t − h (h > 0)
earnings is given by6
cov (yibt, yibt−h) = q2cptpt−h
[
σ2α + x(x− h)σ2β + (2x− h)σαβ
]
+ρhvar (εibt−h) . (9)
The term var (εibt) is calculated by backtracking the recursion in Equation (5) until the
first sample year of each cohort. Since earnings time series are relatively short, consequent
covariances depend on the variance of initial shock that flaws the standard time series analysis
assumption of zero initial conditions. I follow suggestions of MaCurdy (1982; 2007), and treat
the variances of initial shocks as extra parameters to be estimated. This parameter also takes
into account the earnings differences accumulated before the start of sample.7
5Since random walk and random growth specifications do not necessarily rule each other out, some re-
searchers (e.g. Baker & Solon, 2003 and Ramos, 2003) incorporate both into the same model. In my data, this
specification either does not converge or results in negative variance estimates.
6Identification of earnings instability is made possible only by the off-diagonal elements of the covariance
matrix. Intuition for this that a high correlation between earnings at t and earnings at t − h implies that
instability is low and vice versa.
7Initial variance parameters have different interpretation depending on whether the earnings trajectories
of cohorts are left-censored. For a cohort which has been 26 years old before 1988, the initial variance is a
measure of transitory variance accumulated before 1988, whereas for a cohort which is observed for the first
time after 1988, the initial variance is a measure of labor market conditions at the time of labor market entry.
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Since the panel is revolving, an individual can only contribute to the covariance matrix if
he or she is observed in years t and t − h. The sample covariances are thus calculated as the
earnings covariance of people who are observed in both years. Consequently, people who have
a higher attachment to the labor market contribute more to the empirical covariance matrices,
which leads to a sample selection problem of some degree, that cannot be completely overcome
by unbalanced revolving panel construction. This is a common caveat in papers of this genre.
The estimation boils down to minimizing the distance between cohort earnings covariances
implied by the model and the empirical autocovariances calculated from the data. I stack
each unique covariance matrix elements into vector C. Estimation is done by GMM, i.e., by
minimizing the distance between observed autocovariances C and those implied by the model
F (θ) , where θ is a vector of 87 parameters to be estimated. In practice, I minimize the
standard GMM criterion function
H = [C− F (θ)]′W [C− F (θ)] . (10)
Altonji & Segal (1996) demonstrate that using the asymptotically optimal GMM weighting
matrix, i.e., choosing W =
[
F (θ)′F (θ)
]−1
, can lead to very large finite-sample bias. This is
due to correlation of sampling errors in second and fourth moments leading to
[
F (θ)′F (θ)
]−1
being very close to singular. Following the bulk of the income covariance literature, I have
chosen identity matrix as the weighting matrix. This approach is called the Equally Weighted
Minimum Distance (EWMD) estimation (Chamberlain, 1984). Using the identity matrix as
the weighting matrix gives consistent but generally inefficient estimates.8
The asymptotic standard errors of vector θ are given by:
var(θ) =
(
D′D
)−1
D′ΩD
(
D′D
)−1
,
where D =
∂F
∂θ
and Ω = [C− F (θ)]′Q [C− F (θ)] are evaluated at the solution θ = θˆ. Q is a
block diagonal matrix of ones, thus setting covariances between cohorts zero.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Figure 4 decomposes total inequality into its permanent and transitory components. The
decomposition is based on equation (8). The term p2t
[
σ2α + x
2σ2β + 2xσαβ
]
accounts for the
permanent component of earnings and term ρ2var (εibt−1)+λ2t var (νibt) accounts for the tran-
sitory component.
The contribution of permanent earnings inequality to total inequality larger for men than
for women in almost all years. This implies that permanent inequality among men is larger
than among women. The permanent inequality among men has remained roughly similar
8Using the identity matrix as the weighting matrix makes estimation of (10) equivalent to regressing vector
C to vector F (θ) by nonlinear least squares.
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except for the recession years 1991 and 1992. Even though the magnitudes of different compo-
nents are distinct between sexes, the dynamics of the two components of earnings inequality
have been roughly similar for both sexes for the entir.
The transitory components of earnings inequality of men and women are highly correlated,
albeit transitory inequality is higher for women than for men. To see which parameters drive
the patterns observed in Figure 4, Tables 2 and 3 present the estimates of the parameters of
permanent and transitory components. I discuss both parameters in turn.
A first look at Tables 2 and 3 shows that most parameters are accurately estimated in spite
of the model being flexibly parameterized and including year, cohort, and experience effects.
Table 2 reports the parameters of permanent earnings differences. The level term σ2α is
statistically significantly larger for men than for women. The slope term σ2β and the correla-
tion term σαβ are of similar magnitude for both sexes. Moreover, the estimated correlation
between the intercept and slope terms is positive. This means that people who have higher
initial earnings also have larger earnings growth. As a result, permanent earnings distribution
becomes increasingly unequal over the life cycle. Cappellari (2004) reports a similar finding
for Italy, but other studies I am aware of (e.g., Haider, 2001; Baker & Solon, 2003; Baker,
1997) report a negative parameter estimate.
For men, year loadings on permanent earnings component are almost constant except for
the two deepest recession years. For women, there is a downward trend in yearly loading
indicating that the variability in returns to fixed characteristics has decreased during the end
of the 1990s and early 2000s. Year loading on the permanent component are often interpreted
as prices of fixed characteristics of individuals, keeping cohort effects constant.
Next, I turn to estimates for the cohort loadings on the permanent component qc. The
most intuitive interpretation for cohort loadings of permanent component is that they are a
measure of the dispersion of skills within a cohort. An alternative interpretation for qc is that
they reflect very persistent shocks that affect cohorts differently even if the skill dispersion of
cohorts does not change. An example of these shocks is long-term effects of graduating in a
recession (see e.g., Kwon et al., 2010, and Oreopoulos & von Wachter, 2008).
Coinciding with the decrease in yearly factor loadings for women is the increase in cohort
loadings of the permanent component of earnings. This implies that earnings inequality for all
women has decreased after the 1990s, but at the same time, younger cohorts are more unequal
than older cohorts. In other words, as younger cohorts have become more skilled, within
cohort inequality has increased but at the same between-cohort inequality has decreased. For
men, the inequality time trend is of opposite sign: younger cohorts are more equal than older.
Finally, I turn to the estimates for the transitory component reported in Table 3. I discuss
the parameter of the AR-process first. The persistence of transitory shocks is considerably
lower in Finland in comparison to most other studies. Baker & Solon (2003), Dickens (2000),
and Haider (2001) report estimated autocorrelation values in the range of 0.6 and 0.95, but
they concentrate on full- time working males. In contrast, Ramos (2003) does not discriminate
between full-time and part-time workers and finds ρˆ values in the range of 0.29 and 0.41, which
are considerably closer to my estimates. This suggests that the variation in hours worked
substantially reduces the persistence of transitory earnings shocks.
Three lines at the bottom of Table 3 give the parameters of age-heteroskedasticity. The
age profile of the variance of transitory shocks, visualized in Figure 5, is strikingly different
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between men and women. For men, γ1 and γ2 do not statistically significantly differ from
zero, which implies that there is no age-related heteroskedasticity in variance of transitory
shocks. For women, on the other hand, the variance of transitory shocks is decreasing and
convex. For women under 30, the variance of transitory shocks is over double that of men.
Also, regardless of cohort, initial earnings shocks are considerably higher for women than for
men. This observation is roughly consistent with Lundberg & Rose (2000), who find that
motherhood decreases the supply of labor of those married women who are attached to the
labor market but not their wages.
Year loadings on transitory component of earnings λt also exhibit different trends for men
and women.9 For men, they rise and peak in the year 1994. Thereafter, they decline somewhat
but still remain above one until year 2007. For women, there is almost a constant rising trend
from 1988 to 2007.
Adding cohort loadings to transitory component always resulted in convergence problems.
This suggests that cohort effects on the transitory component over-parameterize the model.
Therefore, earnings instability seems to be symmetric for all cohorts after accounting for initial
conditions. Earnings instability seems to be more related to labor market conditions prevailing
in the society rather than to differences in human capital within cohorts. Nonetheless, for both
sexes, the contribution of rising earnings instability is substantial. This gives strong evidence
that earnings have become more instable.
Making comparisons to other countries is somewhat suspect, because separating prevailing
differences in labor market conditions from differences in data is not straightforward. The
most comparable study to the current one in terms of data is Ramos (2003), who studies male
earnings inequality in the U.K. between 1991 and 1999. In comparison to Ramos’ findings,
the permanent earnings differences among British men seem larger than those of Finnish men,
regardless of birth year.
A potentially interesting comparison can be made to Sweden, another Nordic country with
a similar institutional setting to Finland. Gustavsson (2008) fits a model for Sweden that spans
years 1960-1990. Comparing the end of Gustavsson’s sample to the beginning of my sample
reveals large differences. My estimates for the contribution of the transitory component to
total inequality are substantially larger than the estimates presented in Gustavsson’s study.
This discrepancy is at least partly explained by differences in sample composition – especially
by the fact that Gustavsson limits to full-time workers.
4.2 Decomposition analysis: cohorts and years
The parameter estimates only give a partial clarification on the evolution of earnings dynamics.
As discussed in the previous subsection, there is substasntial heterogeneity between cohorts
and years. The total inequality is a compound of age, cohort, and year effects. To get further
insight on these differences, this subsection introduces the decomposition for various years and
cohorts.
Figure 6 plots the decomposition of earnings differences for 3 different cohorts: those born
in 1943-1944, 1955-1956 and those born in 1967-1968.10 Comparing the two pictures reveals
9To identify both λt and the initial variance parameters σ2c , λ1988 is left unrestricted.
10Plotting other cohorts produces similar pictures.
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that the permanent earnings differences between cohorts are considerably higher among men
than among women. Secondly, the permanent earnings differences between cohorts are larger
among men than among women. The dynamics of permanent earnings differences resemble
one another for all cohorts. Permanent earnings differences have risen between 1988 and 2007,
regardless of gender and cohort.
Turning to cohort differences in transitory earnings inequality, the transitory differences
among men are very small. The transitory earnings differences are almost identical, apart
from the initial earnings differences of the youngest cohort. Conversely, the transitory earnings
differences among women are decreasing: earnings instability of young women is considerably
larger than that of older women.
Figure 6 suggests that permanent earnings differences have grown regardless of age, which
suggests earnings inequality driven by increasing year loadings. Figure 7 gives an alternative
view of earnings differences: it looks the differences in a single year, but includes all cohorts.
Again, we observe a growing permanent inequality as people age. The age-permanent inequal-
ity gradient is especially strong for men. The earnings instability is decreasing in age for both
sexes. In addition, we see that the earnings instability has grown, regardless of age.
The underlying assumption in the preceding discussion is that the model is correctly spec-
ified and all parameters are strongly identified. The following section discusses evidence that
speaks in favor of strong identification.
4.3 Identification
A note on the identification of models of second moments of earnings is in order. Generally,
weak identification can arise if the moment condition is small but not zero at a range of values
differing from the true parameter value θ0. Stock & Wright (2000) show that the asymptotic
theory devised for identified models is invalid for weakly identified models. As a result, pa-
rameter estimates of weakly identified models are inconsistent, and the calculated covariance
matrix does not converge to the true covariance matrix, resulting in invalid estimates for stan-
dard errors. Furthermore, even if most parameters are strongly identified, their asymptotic
standard errors might be invalid in the presence of some weakly identified parameters. In the
context of this paper, weak identification may arise if ρ is close to 1. If ρ ≈ 1, the transitory
component is very close to being permanent. This causes problems in identification, since both
the transitory and the permanent components reflect relatively permanent earnings inequality,
making it difficult to distinguish them from one another, especially, if panel length is short.
Doris et al. (2010) gives Monte Carlo evidence on the ranges of parameter values that lead
to biased estimates. According to Tables 2a and 3 in their paper, a model estimated using
eight panel years of observations and ρ = .8 is sufficient to give unbiased results. Since my
panel length is well over that for most cohorts (median panel length in my data is 17 years)
and my estimates of ρ are well below .8, I am confident about the strong identification of the
models estimated. In addition, linear time trends in any factor loading might also weaken the
identification. Such trends are not present in my data.
I have not applied Newey’s (1985) specification test to assess the goodness of fit because
the general finding in earnings dynamics literature is that the null hypothesis of correctly
specified model is virtually always rejected. According to Baker & Solon (2003), these tests
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have inflated sizes when the amount of overidentifying restrictions is as large as in this case
(3,066 moment conditions used to identify 87 parameters).
Another possible caveat, according to warnings in Baker & Solon (2003) and Shin & Solon
(2011), is that an arbitrary change in parametric model may lead to different conclusions.
I have experimented with a wide selection of specifications and find this concern misplaced
for two reasons. First, random walk and random growth specifications for the permanent
component of earnings give quite similar results (estimates for the random growth specification
are not reported). Secondly, more complex specifications for the transitory and permanent
components fail to converge. These two facts suggest that my preferred model correctly
captures the relevant aspects of income dynamics.
5 Summary and conclusions
Previous research has shown that earnings inequality has risen in Finland during the last
two decades. This paper decomposes yearly Finnish log earnings inequality of the working
population into its permanent and transitory components separately for men and for women.
The econometric analysis is based on the second moments of log-earnings using the minimum
distance estimation method of Chamberlain (1984).
I find that the increase in earnings inequality within men as well as within women is driven
by both the permanent and the transitory components, but the contributions of these compo-
nents are of different magnitude for men and women. The permanent component of earnings
inequality is larger in magnitude for men than for women. The age-derivative of permanent
earnings inequality of men and women is similar, indicating that the relative differences in
permanent earnings stay similar throughout the careers of men and women. In addition, the
correlation between initial earnings inequality and the growth in earnings inequality is found
to be positive for both males and female, implying a divergence of earnings profiles and in-
creasing permanent earnings differences towardt the end of the working career. As a corollary,
men face more stabile income paths but with larger permanent earnings differences. Women,
on the other hand, face more instable earnings profiles but have smaller permanent differences
in earnings.
In addition, the contribution of transitory shocks to inequality has risen considerably for
both sexes. This strongly suggests that earnings have become more instable during the last
20 years.
Since the measure of income used in this paper is pre-tax earnings, contributions of taxes
and public transfers to total inequality are not observed. Since Finland has a highly redis-
tributive social insurance system, a complementary analysis concentrating on usable income
instead of pre-tax earnings is called for.
Finding ultimate causes for changes in persistent and transitory inequality is beyond the
scope of this paper, but some tentative explanations can be devised. First, a possible expla-
nation to the rise in permanent earnings inequality is changes in returns to education. Since
there are no clear trends in year loadings, it seems unlikely that such upward trending returns
to education have played a strong role in the time period. Increasing cohort effects on perma-
nent female earnings inequality suggest that younger working women face higher permanent
14
earnings inequality than older women. It seems more plausible that this is due to high em-
ployment participation of young women rather than changing returns to skills because there
is no such trend for cohorts of men.
Finally, lessons from this paper suggest that the standard approach of concentrating only on
males might hide potentially important aspects of earnings dynamics prevalent in the society.
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Cohort Years observed Age in initial year Sample size (men) Sample size (women)
1933-1934 1988-1994 55 2 882 3 673
1935-1936 1988-1996 53 5 169 6 579
1937-1938 1988-1998 51 7 383 8 954
1939-1940 1988-2000 49 8 595 9 987
1941-1942 1988-2002 47 10 398 11 736
1943-1944 1988-2004 45 11 593 12 877
1945-1946 1988-2006 43 16 817 18 481
1947-1948 1988-2007 41 18 760 19 801
1949-1950 1988-2007 39 18 026 19 311
1951-1952 1988-2007 37 17 735 18 784
1953-1954 1988-2007 35 17 643 18 982
1955-1956 1988-2007 33 18 377 18 926
1957-1958 1988-2007 31 17 610 17 769
1959-1960 1988-2007 29 18 060 17 562
1961-1962 1988-2007 27 18 447 16 932
1963-1964 1989-2007 26 18 720 16 700
1965-1966 1991-2007 26 17 945 15 930
1967-1968 1993-2007 26 17 688 15 357
1969-1970 1995-2007 26 16 057 13 476
1971-1972 1997-2007 26 15 095 12 209
1973-1974 1999-2007 26 14 248 11 343
1975-1976 2001-2007 26 13 482 9 548
Total 320 729 314 916
Table 1: Cohorts included in the analysis. Note: Age is defined by older of the two birth
cohorts.
18
1990 1995 2000 2005
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
Year
Va
ria
nc
e 
of
 lo
g 
ea
rn
in
gs
Men
Women
Figure 1: Yearly earnings inequality (measured by variance of log earnings of workers) of men
(solid line) and women (dashed line).
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Men Women
Parameter S.E. Parameter S.E.
p1988 1 1
p1989 1.017 0.010 0.983 0.011
p1990 1.014 0.009 0.944 0.010
p1991 0.737 0.019 0.811 0.009
p1992 0.754 0.019 0.813 0.008
p1993 1.071 0.016 0.913 0.012
p1994 1.102 0.016 0.937 0.009
p1995 1.094 0.018 0.907 0.012
p1996 1.079 0.016 0.908 0.016
p1997 1.063 0.014 0.892 0.015
p1998 1.058 0.017 0.907 0.016
p1999 1.067 0.020 0.898 0.016
p2000 1.054 0.016 0.904 0.013
p2001 1.043 0.014 0.894 0.015
p2002 1.043 0.015 0.893 0.015
p2003 1.063 0.014 0.889 0.012
p2004 1.067 0.013 0.876 0.011
p2005 1.044 0.013 0.855 0.012
p2006 1.028 0.013 0.854 0.013
p2007 1.017 0.015 0.825 0.012
q1933−1934 0.977 0.016 0.777 0.010
q1935−1936 1.054 0.012 0.846 0.007
q1937−1938 1.076 0.009 0.847 0.005
q1939−1940 1.005 0.007 0.876 0.004
q1941−1942 1.049 0.005 0.904 0.003
q1943−1944 1.047 0.004 0.940 0.003
q1945−1946 1.033 0.003 0.938 0.002
q1947−1948 1.034 0.002 0.958 0.001
q1949−1950 1.004 0.001 0.971 0.001
q1951−1952 1 1
q1953−1954 1.000 0.001 1.014 0.001
q1955−1956 1.004 0.002 1.059 0.002
q1957−1958 1.026 0.004 1.097 0.003
q1959−1960 1.010 0.005 1.148 0.005
q1961−1962 1.037 0.007 1.187 0.007
q1963−1964 1.018 0.009 1.192 0.010
q1965−1966 0.992 0.011 1.217 0.012
q1967−1968 0.952 0.013 1.223 0.015
q1969−1970 0.922 0.015 1.267 0.018
q1971−1972 0.907 0.017 1.260 0.023
q1973−1974 0.863 0.020 1.294 0.031
q1975−1976 0.774 0.026 1.129 0.050
σ2a 0.156 0.003 0.093 0.002
σ2b 1.5 ∗ 10−5 8 ∗ 10−6 2.9 ∗ 10−5 6 ∗ 10−6
σab 0.004 2 ∗ 10−4 0.004 1 ∗ 10−4
Table 2: Estimated parameters of permanent component of earnings.
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Men Women
Parameter S.E. Parameter S.E.
λ1988 (unrestricted) (unrestricted)
λ1989 1 1
λ1990 1.057 0.018 1.043 0.019
λ1991 1.279 0.067 1.086 0.024
λ1992 1.380 0.066 1.156 0.024
λ1993 1.384 0.050 1.207 0.028
λ1994 1.487 0.060 1.273 0.031
λ1995 1.413 0.057 1.276 0.032
λ1996 1.395 0.063 1.254 0.036
λ1997 1.349 0.065 1.244 0.037
λ1998 1.366 0.079 1.277 0.039
λ1999 1.335 0.068 1.297 0.043
λ2000 1.331 0.075 1.290 0.047
λ2001 1.290 0.072 1.287 0.047
λ2002 1.288 0.073 1.214 0.051
λ2003 1.243 0.071 1.203 0.062
λ2004 1.239 0.076 1.230 0.057
λ2005 1.253 0.071 1.271 0.054
λ2006 1.312 0.080 1.319 0.050
λ2007 1.302 0.073 1.358 0.045
σ21933−1934 0.025 0.009 0.058 0.005
σ21935−1936 0.003 0.009 0.023 0.004
σ21937−1938 0.067 0.009 0.029 0.004
σ21939−1940 0.054 0.007 0.035 0.004
σ21941−1942 0.097 0.008 0.053 0.004
σ21943−1944 0.101 0.007 0.071 0.004
σ21945−1946 0.109 0.007 0.088 0.004
σ21947−1948 0.132 0.006 0.117 0.004
σ21949−1950 0.123 0.006 0.120 0.003
σ21951−1952 0.128 0.005 0.150 0.003
σ21953−1954 0.113 0.005 0.188 0.003
σ21955−1956 0.106 0.004 0.216 0.003
σ21957−1958 0.103 0.004 0.220 0.003
σ21959−1960 0.117 0.004 0.218 0.003
σ21961−1962 0.135 0.003 0.230 0.002
σ21963−1964 0.141 0.004 0.227 0.004
σ21965−1966 0.210 0.004 0.254 0.002
σ21967−1968 0.323 0.005 0.357 0.002
σ21969−1970 0.281 0.003 0.361 0.002
σ21971−1972 0.246 0.003 0.318 0.003
σ21973−1974 0.255 0.004 0.362 0.004
σ21975−1976 0.205 0.005 0.318 0.007
ρ 0.223 0.012 0.226 0.009
γ0 0.112 0.013 0.249 0.015
γ1 -0.001 0.001 -0.011 0.001
γ2 9 ∗ 10−6 2.7 ∗ 10−5 2 ∗ 10−4 3 ∗ 10−5
Table 3: Estimated parameters of transitory variance of earnings.
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Figure 5: Variance of transitory shocks of men and women as a function of age.
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